Why We Should Worry About Haiti’s Rebuilding Process: A Historical Lesson
Posted on 04. Feb, 2010 by Michael Neil in Op-Ed, [Inter]national
With the news that over one million Haitians remain homeless and that efforts are shifting away from the construction of permanent housing in favor of do-it-yourself wooden and, occasionally, steel structures, concern over the future of Haiti’s rebuilding process abounds. Even the International Organization for Migration sees few permanent structures emerging in less than five years, according to the February 3 edition of the New York Times. This worry remains despite volunteer and donation responses, as well as government promises (which might be hollow during a global recession). What is the United States to do? Many Haitians and Americans fear that the answer is, as has been shown in other sectors, outsource to private companies. Are these the paranoid fears of leftist bloggers and academicians, or can history provide clues on why such concerns might be legitimate? I would like to suggest the latter.
American foreign policy is wrought with “stabilizations”, “invasions”, “peacekeeping missions” and assorted gallivanting, for good or ill, across the world from Iraq to Iran to the Congo, and, especially nations in our own hemisphere such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Grenada, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and many others. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has convinced itself that it has the authority and legitimacy to act as the sole arbiter of policy and international affairs within the Western Hemisphere. While it may be that some good came of some of these adventures, I would like to frame current concerns about Haiti around a nineteen year military occupation dating from 1915-1934 that modestly modernized the nation but at the cost of popular will and democracy, especially causing devastation to Haiti’s non-mulatto poor.
In February 1915, then-President Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam established a dictatorship in Haiti, but in July, facing a peasant revolt, he massacred 167 political prisoners, and was murdered as a result. Fearing further instability as the last five years had brought six different Presidents into power, but more concerned about American business interests (especially the Haitian-American Sugar Company), President Woodrow Wilson went on alert. Afraid of losing market share to the small but powerful German community, and even more afraid that the anti-American Rosalvo Bobo, who had attracted a great deal of support from poor peasants, would accede to the Presidency, the United States moved swiftly. According to authors Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal, with the arrival of 330 marines, American economic security as well as dominance over Haitian affairs was assured. They report:
“The specific order from the Secretary of the Navy to the invasion commander, Admiral William Deville Bundy, was to “protect American and foreign” interests. However, to avoid public criticism the occupation was labeled as a mission to “re-establish peace and order…[and] has nothing to do with any diplomatic negotiations of the past or the future” as disclosed by Rear Admiral Caperton.”
By mid-November 1915, the last peasant stronghold had fallen.
The Haitian government had received large loans from American and French banks over the preceding decades and was growing increasingly incapable of fulfilling debt repayment. Within six weeks of the occupation, representatives from the United States controlled Haitian customs houses and institutions such as banks and the national treasury. Through manipulation, 40% of the national income went to alleviating debt repayment to American and French banks. This economic decision ignored the interests of the majority of the Haitian population. For the next nineteen years, United States advisers governed the country, enforced by the United States Marine Corps.
Representatives wielded veto power over all governmental decisions, and Marine Corps commanders served as administrators. Opposition to the occupation began immediately after the Marines entered. The rebels vehemently resisted American control. In response, the Haitian and American governments began a vigorous campaign to disband the rebel armies.
Phillip Sudre Dartiguenave, the president of the Senate, agreed to accept the presidency and, in 1917, he dissolved the legislature after its members refused to approve a new American-written constitution. However, a referendum subsequently approved it in 1918. Though generally a liberal document, it allowed foreigners to purchase land, which had been disallowed by patriot Jean-Jacques Dessalines and was considered odious by most Haitians.
In 1922, Dartiguenave was replaced by Louis Borno, whose dictatorial rule lasted until 1930. That same year, General John H. Russell Jr. was appointed High Commissioner. The Borno-Russell dictatorship expanded the economy, building over 1,000 miles of road, modernizing facilities, and establishing a public health service. Sugar and cotton became significant exports. However, the Great Depression destroyed even this progress. By 1930, President Hoover became concerned about the occupation, particularly after a December 1929 incident in Les Cayes, where Marines killed ten Haitian peasants. Although disengagement policies began by 1932 and the last U.S. Marines departed on August 15, 1934, the U.S. retained dominion over Haiti’s finances until 1947.
Is this a guarantee that American contractors would act similarly if let loose today? Certainly not. Nothing in history is inevitable, but the entwined nature of business and politics in Haitian-American foreign relations ought to give scholars and attentive readers everywhere pause. It is also true that certain gains arose from the American effort and some Haitians see the period as one of unusual stability. Nevertheless, according to International Studies PhD, Figaro Joseph, both Haiti’s poor and intellectuals are frightened by the prospect American rebuilding.
